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 Problems and Recommendations 
Leading the Counter-Revolution 
Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has survived the revo-
lutions in the Arab world largely unscathed and en-
trenched itself as the undisputed leader of both the 
Gulf monarchies and the wealthy oil- and gas-produc-
ing states. Its example and the support it provides 
shape the ways other still stable regimes deal with 
protest movements. In this context, the Saudi ruling 
family draws on significant historical and religious 
legitimacy and uses its considerable oil revenues to 
buy support. 
It is, however, not only their relative stability that 
distinguishes the Arab states of the Persian Gulf from 
other countries in the region. Instead, in Saudi Arabia 
and other Gulf states rulers’ fears of restiveness meld 
with a conflict between Iran and its regional rivals that 
stimulates growing confessional tensions. Saudi Arabia 
and its allies see the Shiite protests in the Saudi East-
ern Province and Bahrain not as movements against 
authoritarian regimes, but in the first place as an Ira-
nian attempt to topple legitimate governments with 
the help of the Arab Shiites. Saudi Arabia has long 
suspected Iran of seeking predominance in the Gulf 
region and the Middle East, and has since 2005 pur-
sued an increasingly resolute and sometimes aggres-
sive regional policy vis-à-vis Tehran. Riyadh interprets 
the unrest observed among Saudi and Bahraini Shiites 
since 2011 first and foremost in that context. 
The Arab Spring is therefore both a domestic and 
a foreign policy issue in Saudi Arabia. At home the 
Saudi leadership is pursuing a carrot-and-stick strategy. 
In spring 2011 it quickly announced enormous direct 
and indirect payments to the population, in order to 
avert protests. At the same time, unambiguous threats 
and a strengthened presence of security forces at 
potential meeting places and in traditionally restive 
areas sufficed to nip planned demonstrations in the 
bud in March 2011. In the Shiite-populated east of 
the country the government repeatedly ensured that 
nascent protests were suppressed before they could 
grow. Riyadh responded with particular hostility to 
any cooperation between Shiite and liberal reformers. 
Responding to the events of spring 2011, Saudi 
Arabia also followed a twin-track regional policy. 
Firstly, it attempted to stabilise the Jordanian and 
Moroccan monarchies and backed the army in Egypt, 
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Problems and Recommendations 
making it the most important proponent of the 
authoritarian status quo (ante) in the region. Sec-
ondly, Riyadh countered Iranian hegemonic strivings 
more vigorously than before. In March 2011 Saudi 
Arabia led the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait 
and Qatar to the aid of the Bahraini leadership when 
protests by local Shiites threatened to spiral out of 
control. Saudi Arabia is also acting assertively in Syria, 
where especially since September 2013 it has been 
supporting the opposition and rebel insurgents with 
money and arms in order to hasten the fall of the Iran-
allied Assad regime. 
Despite its sometimes aggressive foreign policy, 
Saudi Arabia remains an important partner for Ger-
many and Europe. But the relationship has become 
less easy than it used to be. The question of where the 
limits of cooperation lie will always have to be asked, 
and debates will flare up over security-related matters 
such as arms sales. Germany has an interest in Saudi 
stability, so the construction of a border security sys-
tem by Airbus Defence (formerly Cassidian) makes 
sense from a political perspective, too, and should 
continue to be supported by the German federal police 
training mission. It is also understandable that Saudi 
Arabia sees Iran as a threat and would like to strength-
en its armed forces by purchasing warplanes such as 
the Eurofighter Typhoon. On the other hand, arms 
deals become questionable where there are grounds 
to suspect that the supplied systems would be used 
to suppress domestic opposition. The intervention in 
Bahrain in March 2011 demonstrated all too clearly 
the Saudi leadership’s willingness to take military 
action against Shiite unrest both in neighbouring 
Bahrain and in its own Eastern Province. It was there-
fore correct to refuse to supply the Boxer armoured 
personnel carrier, because such vehicles are often 
used to suppress unrest. Germany would have had to 
reckon with seeing the personnel carriers used in the 
Shiite areas, to the detriment of Berlin’s credibility in 
the Arab world. In the conventional version ordered by 
Riyadh, the Leopard tank is less problematic because it 
is largely unsuited for internal deployment. But if the 
Saudi leadership were to revive its earlier request for 
the 2A7+ version developed specifically for counter-
insurgency, Berlin should decline. 
But German policies towards Saudi Arabia must be 
about more than conducting trade and avoiding mis-
takes. The greatest threat to Germany’s interest in 
long-term stability is the Saudi leadership’s mistaken 
policies towards the Shiites. Riyadh’s regional policy 
is governed by its fear that Iran might mobilise the 
Shiites in the Arab world and ultimately even within 
Saudi Arabia. That interpretation owes more to the 
paranoia of the ruling family than any sober assess-
ment of the situation on the ground. Iranian influence 
on the Shiites in Saudi Arabia (and in Bahrain) is mini-
mal and there is no evidence that Tehran could per-
suade them to rise against Riyadh. In fact it is Saudi 
repression in the Eastern Province and in Bahrain that 
threatens to drive the Shiites into the arms of Iran, 
Hizbullah or Iraqi Shiite groups. Rather than coercion, 
a political solution including full civil rights for the 
Shiites in Saudi Arabia and in Bahrain is required. 
That would also be an important precondition for 
reducing confessional tensions – which have been 
growing again since 2011 – across the entire region. 
Although Germany’s influence here is very limited, it 
has grown through the intensified contacts of recent 
years. The German government should continue to 
foster these ties and give them a political dimension. 
Concretely, Berlin should always push for Saudi Arabia 
to accept the Shiites’ demands for full equality and 
an end to discrimination. For only through slow but 
directed change can the Kingdom remain stable. 
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 Protests in Saudi Arabia 
 
The events in Tunisia and Egypt in February and 
March 2011 also encouraged many Saudis to protest 
against their own government. At the first sign of 
unrest the government responded with detentions, 
an increased presence of security forces, and warnings 
to the population. At the same time King Abdallah 
announced direct and indirect payments to the people, 
intended to ameliorate the economic causes of dis-
satisfaction in the country. In February and March 
2011 he promised to spend a total of $130 billion on 
causes including tackling widespread unemployment 
and housing shortages.1 After this the west and centre 
of the country remained largely calm, while the Shiites 
living mostly in the east repeatedly took to the streets 
nonetheless. Although the security forces always had 
the situation under control, Riyadh remained con-
cerned, as the protests in the east endured and parts 
of the movement became increasingly militant and 
uncompromising. 
The Islamist and Liberal Oppositions 
Sporadic protests in February 2011 led to calls for a 
“day of rage” on 11 March, where Saudis were sum-
moned to join demonstrations on the streets of the 
capital Riyadh following the model of the Tunisians 
and Egyptians. Anonymous activists set up a Facebook 
group entitled “The people want to bring down the 
regime” (al-shaʽb yurid isqat al-nizam), expressing 
demands including an elected parliament, an in-
dependent judiciary and the release of all political 
prisoners.2 The day after the call was published, a 
representative of the Interior Ministry went on state-
run television to emphasise that all protests were 
prohibited and that the security forces would prevent 
any demonstrations. Another day later, the Council 
of Senior Religious Scholars (Hay’at kibar al-ʽulama), 
as the country’s supreme religious institution, an-
nounced that demonstrations or any other insurrec-
1  James Gavin, “Riyadh Spends to Curb Unrest”, Middle East 
Economic Digest, (15–21 April 2011): 30–32 (30). 
2  Amnesty International, Saudi Arabia. Repression in the Name 
of Security (London, 2011), 43. 
tion against the ruler were incompatible with Islam. 
According to media reports the Saudi leadership 
mobilised thousands of troops to prevent protests.3 
These measures were enough to keep the “day of rage” 
from occurring. Just one demonstrator appeared at 
the appointed place, where he was arrested shortly 
after giving an interview to the BBC.4 Only in the east 
of the country were larger demonstrations reported 
on and around 11 March. 
Since early 2011 the government has repeatedly 
taken action against Islamist and liberal critics. The 
reasons behind the arrests and other measures were 
not always clear. Open criticism of prominent princes 
or the ruling family as a whole and overt challenges to 
the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam predominant in 
the country drew particularly harsh responses. While 
this had been Saudi policy since the 1980s, the govern-
ment appears to have interpreted the permitted bounds 
of these two types of criticism somewhat more loosely 
than in previous decades. That was probably largely 
due to a change in threat perception: What the Saudi 
leadership fears most, since the beginning of the Arab 
Spring, is street protests by the youth. Those who re-
frained from calling demonstrations or directly criti-
cising the ruling family could reckon with rather 
more tolerance than just a few years ago.5 
Although this new line created a certain space for 
expressions of alternate opinion, the government still 
clamped down hard on liberal and Islamist intellectu-
als. Among the Islamists this primarily affected groups 
and individuals strongly influenced by the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The government’s position hardened 
after it backed the Egyptian military coup against the 
Brotherhood’s President Muhammad Mursi in July 
2013. In Saudi Arabia this was also understood as a 
message to the Islamists at home, who are not for-
mally organised but have many supporters. In early 
March 2014 the Saudi Arabian Interior Ministry placed 
the Muslim Brotherhood on a list of terrorist organisa-
3  Robert Fisk, “Saudis Mobilise Thousands of Troops to 
Quell Growing Revolt”, Independent, 5 March 2011. 
4  Amnesty International, Saudi Arabia (see note 2), 44f. 
5  Interview with Saudi Arabian blogger, Kuwait, 4 March 
2013. 
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Protests in Saudi Arabia 
tions, even though no terrorist attacks have been attri-
buted to it.6 
First affected was the group of Islamist intellectuals 
who founded the Islamic Umma Party (Hizb al-Umma 
al-Islami) on 9 February 2011. That was in itself a 
provocation, given that political parties are banned 
as un-Islamic in Saudi Arabia. The Umma Party has 
existed since 2005 in Kuwait, where it originated in an 
initiative by the Salafist activist Hakim al-Mutairi, who 
is a leading theorist of a sub-group of the Kuwaiti 
Salafist mainstream that blends Salafist thinking with 
the political orientation of the Muslim Brotherhood.7 
In that respect the teachings of the Umma Party 
resemble those of other parties in the Gulf that have 
since the 1960s melded aspects of Saudi Wahhabism 
with the ideas of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. 
Mutairi, who seeks to reconcile Salafism with demo-
cratic principles, is sometimes described as a “liberal 
Salafist”.8 While this may sound very moderate in 
theory, it is extremely threatening to regimes in the 
Gulf. According to Mutairi, the Kuwaiti Umma Party 
seeks to end the rule of the regimes in all Gulf states 
by peaceful means, terminate the region’s fragmen-
tation into smaller states (duwailat) and force the 
Americans to withdraw from the region.9 Although 
the Kuwaiti Umma Party is only a splinter group, its 
establishment in 2005 caused a great stir. Mutairi is 
a well-known figure in the Gulf, and the Saudi leader-
ship must have followed the developments in its 
smaller neighbour with consternation. The political 
scene in Kuwait is very liberal and pluralist by 
regional standards, and is regarded as a nuisance, if 
not indeed outright dangerous, in Saudi Arabia and 
the UAE in particular. 
6  The Muslim Brotherhood was the only non-militant or-
ganization on the list, alongside jihadist groups such as the 
Syrian Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria 
(ISIS). 
7  The theorist of “scientific Salafism” is the scholar Abd 
al-Rahman Abd al-Khaliq (born 1939), who expounded these 
ideas in his main work The Path: Basics of the Method of the Ahl 
al-Sunna wa-l- Jamaʽa in doctrine and practice (Al-Sirat: Usul man-
haj ahl al-sunna wa-l-jamaʽa fi l-iʽtiqad wa-l-ʽamal) of 2000. 
Interview with Hakim al-Mutairi and Sajid al-Abdali, Kuwait, 
19 April 2007. 
8  Stéphane Lacroix, “Comparing the Arab Revolts: Is Saudi 
Arabia Immune?” Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (October 2011): 
48–59 (50). 
9  Mutairi said this in the presence of the author at a presen-
tation of the goals of his party to young Saudi Muslim Brothers. 
Interview with Hakim al-Mutairi and Sajid al-Abdali, Kuwait, 
19 April 2007. 
Experience with the Kuwaiti Umma Party also 
shaped Riyadh’s approach to its Saudi Arabian off-
shoot. Although the two groups appear to cooperate 
only informally, the Saudi Umma Party likewise 
draws on the thinking of Hakim al-Mutairi, and made 
this clear in its choice of name. Its founding document 
calls for democratic reforms, including parliamentary 
elections and a division of powers, but also the enforce-
ment of Islamic values in domestic and foreign policy. 
The founders were religious scholars, university pro-
fessors and businessmen with Salafist leanings.10 De-
spite its initially moderate demands, the Saudi ruling 
family had to assume that the nine founding members 
– like Mutairi and the Kuwaiti Umma Party – were 
ultimately seeking to topple their regime, and their 
response was correspondingly rapid and rigorous. The 
founders were arrested within days, but released in 
the course of 2011 after promising to refrain from po-
litical activities in future. Only the religious scholar 
and lawyer Abd al-Aziz al-Wuhaibi refused to renounce 
political activity, and was sentenced to seven years im-
prisonment in September 2011.11 
Even Islamists who made less provocative demands 
found themselves facing heightened state repression. 
The case of Salman al-Auda (born 1956) was especially 
prominent. He was one of the leaders of the Islamist 
opposition after the Kuwait war of 1990/91 and spent 
the years 1994–1999 in prison. After his release he 
toned down his positions and became one of the coun-
try’s best-known scholars with his own television pro-
grammes and a professionally managed internet and 
social network presence.12 The regime stopped two of 
his television programmes after he repeatedly spoke 
approvingly of the revolutions in the region, and 
he was also subjected to a travel ban in 2012.13 These 
measures did not, however, prevent Auda from pub-
lishing his thoughts on the Arab Spring in a book en-
titled “Questions on the revolution” (Masa’il al-thaura).14 
While the official response to Auda’s statements was 
reserved, it sent a clear message to the Saudi Islamists. 
10  The founding declaration and a list of founding members 
were placed on the Party’s website, http://islamicommaparty. 
com/Portals/Content/?info=TkRnNEpsTjFZbEJoWjJVbU1TWmhj
bUk9K3U=.jsp (accessed 5 September 2013). In spring 2014 the 
website was no longer functional. 
11  Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2012: 
The State of the World’s Human Rights (London, 2012), 287f. 
12  See Salman al-Auda’s website, http://www.islamtoday.net. 
13  Monika Bolliger, “Islamische Kritik an der saudischen 
Regierung”, Neuer Zürcher Zeitung, 17 April 2012. 
14  Salman al-Auda, Masa’il al-thaura (Questions on the revo-
lution) (Beirut, 2012). 
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The Islamist and Liberal Oppositions 
Auda, namely, is regarded as a protagonist of a current 
named Islamic Awakening (al-Sahwa al-Islamiya) that 
arose in the 1960s and 1970s and, like the Umma Party, 
combined aspects of Saudi Wahhabism with elements 
of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood thinking.15 This 
current led the Islamist opposition during the 1990s, 
which is one of the reasons for the Saudi regime’s 
hostile attitude towards the Muslim Brotherhood as 
a whole. Its disciplining of the popular Auda was an 
unmistakable sign that the government rejected the 
revolutions in the region, regarded the assumption 
of power by the Muslim Brotherhood elsewhere as a 
danger, and would not tolerate its activities in Saudi 
Arabia (where it is banned anyway). When the govern-
ment sharpened its stance towards the Muslim Broth-
erhood in 2013, this was also understood as a message 
to the Sahwa al-Islamiya. But as of early summer 2014 
no more concrete action had been taken. 
The liberal opposition also found itself facing 
repression, although in its case this was nothing new. 
However, the example of the reformers Muhammad 
al-Qahtani and Abdallah al-Hamid in 2012 and 2013 
drew great attention. Whereas Hamid has been one 
of the country’s leading liberals since the 1990s, the 
younger Qahtani had only become known to a broader 
public in recent years. Qahtani drew attention for his 
unusually strong criticism of the political system and 
prominent members of the ruling family. While not 
calling directly for the fall of the regime, he did pre-
dict that that would be the outcome unless it was 
prepared to undergo fundamental reforms. He called 
the powerful Interior Minister Naif bin Abd al-Aziz a 
criminal on account of the mistreatment of thousands 
of political prisoners and called on the king to sack 
and prosecute him.16 In 2009 Hamid and Qahtani were 
among the founders of the Saudi Civil and Political 
Rights Association (Jam‘iyat al-huquq al-madaniya wa-
l-siyasiya fi al-Su‘udiya), which principally campaigned 
for the release of political prisoners and political 
reforms to expand participation and the rule of law. 
In March 2013 both were sentenced to long terms of 
imprisonment – Qahtani ten years and Hamid five – 
15  For detail on this current see Stéphane Lacroix, Awakening 
Islam: The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi Arabia 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), passim. 
Alongside Auda its most important figure is Safar al-Hawali 
(born 1950). 
16  Thomas Lippman, “Saudi Professor Faces Charges after 
Fighting for Free Speech”, Al-Monitor, 29 June 2012. 
by a special court originally set up for terrorism cases, 
on charges including rebellion against the king.17 
Another case demonstrates how the government 
responded especially testily to joint activities by lib-
eral and Shiite oppositionists. Its ire was drawn by Mu-
hammad Said Tayyib (born 1939), who has long been 
one of the country’s best-known liberal reformers, 
alongside Hamid, Matruk al-Falih and Ali al-Dumayni, 
but less often the target of state persecution. In 2003 
he was one of the most prominent signatories of the 
“In Defence of the Fatherland” petition (Difaʽan ʽan 
al-watan), calling for the establishment of a constitu-
tional monarchy.18 The demand crossed one of the 
regime’s red lines and it had some of the leaders 
arrested, including Tayyib, who was however only 
briefly detained. In December 2011 Tayyib presented 
another petition together with liberal and Shiite 
reformers, criticising the sentencing of sixteen liberal 
intellectuals in Jeddah to long prison sentences and 
condemning the brutality of the security forces against 
Shiite protests in the east of the country.19 Shortly 
after publication of the document, the government 
forced Tayyib to withdraw his signature and apologise 
on state-run television. For several months he was 
prohibited from leaving the country. This reaction 
revealed what danger the government saw in the 
Shiite street protests, such that it was unable to ignore 
the demands of Tayyib and his collaborators for the 
right to free speech, freedom of association and free-
dom of assembly. It also wanted to prevent at all costs 
any alliance between the (Sunni) liberal and Shiite 
oppositions. The petitioners’ open accusation that the 
government was stoking confessional strife (ta’ifiya) by 
permanently emphasising supposed Iranian influence 
on Shiite demonstrators must have appeared an un-
bearable provocation to Riyadh, which places the blame 
for growing religious polarisation firmly at the door of 
Iran and the region’s Shiites. 
17  Hamid also had to serve an older six-year sentence. Jürg 
Bischoff, “Gefängnis für Dissidenten: Hohe Strafen in Saudi-
arabien”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 11 March 2013. 
18  Difaʽan ʽan al-watan (In defence of the fatherland), 
September 2003. The text can be found on Muhammad Said 
Tayyib’s website: http://www.mstayeb.com/index.php? 
option=com_content&view=article&id=146:defa3aanwatan& 
catid=20:isla7&Itemid=5. 
19  Bayan haul muhakamat al-islahiyin bi-Jidda wa-ahdath al-Qatif 
al-mu’sifa (Declaration on the prosecution of the reformers in 
Jeddah and the sad events of Qatif), 5 December 2011, http:// 
www.mstayeb.com/index.php?option=com_content&view= 
article&id=259:bayan&catid=20:isla7&Itemid=5. 
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Protests in Saudi Arabia 
The Shiite Protest Movement 
In Saudi Arabia the Arab Spring was felt most acutely 
among the Shiites of the Eastern Province. While 
the west and centre of the country remained largely 
calm, repeated demonstrations occurred in the Shiite-
populated regions and continued beyond 2011. The 
Saudi leadership regards these protests as a threat 
to the country’s stability, especially after the Shiites 
in neighbouring Bahrain demonstrated against the 
ruling House of Khalifa there. Riyadh fears that the 
ongoing unrest since spring 2011 in allied Bahrain 
could spread, regarding the situation as particularly 
dangerous because it sees the Shiites in the Eastern 
Province (and in Bahrain) as a potential fifth column 
of Iran. Riyadh accuses Tehran of stirring up the Shiite 
minorities in the Gulf states in order to destabilise 
them. Since 2011 the trouble in the Eastern Province 
has become chronic and many Shiite youths are 
turning increasingly militant because they no longer 
believe they can achieve equality by peaceful means. 
This has produced a generation conflict with the older 
representatives of the Shiite community, who made 
their peace with the regime at the beginning of the 
1990s but see their influence evaporating in the course 
of today’s youth radicalisation. 
The Shiite minority in Saudi Arabia has always suf-
fered political, economic and cultural discrimination 
and long rejected Saudi rule. Shiites represent up to 
15 percent of the population, corresponding to a figure 
of between two and three million. Most of them live in 
the Eastern Province, where they represent about half 
the population. Because this region is also home to the 
oil industry and all the country’s major oil fields, the 
“Shiite problem” acquires special strategic signifi-
cance. The roots of anti-Shiite discrimination in Saudi 
Arabia lie in the role of Wahhabism as a kind of state 
religion and the deep influence of Wahhabi scholars 
on the country’s religious and political culture. Wah-
habism is a Sunni reform movement that refuses to 
recognise Shiites as Muslims.20 The conflict heated 
up after the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and has 
remained on the boil since, despite a period of relaxa-
tion in the 1990s. 
Only after relations with Iran worsened again from 
2005 did the Saudi authorities return to a more repres-
20  Guido Steinberg, “The Wahhabiya and Shi’ism, from 
1744/45 to 2008”, in The Sunna and Shi’a in History: Division and 
Ecumenism in History, ed. Ofra Bengio and Meir Litvak (New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 163–82. 
sive approach. Riyadh feared that an increasingly 
aggressive Iran could again seek to destabilise Saudi 
Arabia, with the assistance of Saudi Shiites. Such 
fears are only partially justified. Although it must be 
assumed that Iranian intelligence services are present 
in eastern Saudi Arabia and might even carry out 
terrorist attacks, there is no longer any militant pro-
Iranian current among the Saudi Shiites. The policies 
of the Saudi leadership are driven more by its preju-
dice-based mischaracterisation of the domestic Shiites 
as Iran-loyal sectarians, and not by their actual politi-
cal orientations. This has had fatal consequences, 
because tightening repression generated huge bitter-
ness among many Saudi Shiites. Resentment exploded 
in February 2009, when Shiite pilgrims from the east 
of the country clashed with Saudi security forces in 
Medina. In the following weeks isolated incidents of 
unrest were also reported from the Shiite-populated 
east.21 
The situation in the Shiite areas was thus already 
highly charged when news of the protests in other 
Arab countries began circulating from January 2011. 
After the government quickly reinforced its security 
forces in the eastern regions, that spring saw only 
isolated demonstrations by a few hundred Shiites. 
Only briefly, immediately following the Saudi inter-
vention in Bahrain on 14 March, did the numbers 
swell to a few thousand. Alongside the heavy presence 
of security forces, the government’s promise to im-
prove their living conditions if the Shiites remained 
quiescent was probably also a factor that kept the 
Province a great deal calmer than neighbouring 
Bahrain during the subsequent months. But dissatis-
faction persisted after the security forces arrested 
some of the leaders of the early protests. The detention 
of the Shiite scholar Taufiq al-Amir at the end of Feb-
ruary 2011 for demanding a constitutional monarchy 
provoked particular resentment. The demand is rather 
moderate, but one to which the Saudi government has 
always reacted sensitively, especially when expressed 
by a Shiite.22 The next confrontation was more or less 
inevitable. 
Shiite youths clashed with police in early October 
2011 in the Shiite town of Awamiya in Eastern Prov-
ince, leaving eleven police injured by gunshots and 
petrol bombs according to government reports. The 
21  Toby Matthiesen, “The Shi’a of Saudi Arabia at a Cross-
roads”, Middle East Report Online, 6 May 2009, http://www. 
merip.org/mero/mero050609 (accessed 23 November 2013). 
22  “Saudi Arabian Authorities Release Arrested Shiite Cleric”, 
arabianbusiness.com, 7 March 2011. 
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The Shiite Protest Movement 
“events of Awamiya” marked the start of a series 
of protests that escalated over the following three 
months, especially after the first young Shiites were 
shot dead on 20 November. Altogether twelve young 
Saudi protestors were to die in 2011 and 2012. The 
funerals of the young men turned into the largest 
demonstrations seen in Eastern Province since 1979–
80.23 The demonstrators demanded the release of the 
political prisoners and an end to the discrimination 
of the Shiites in Saudi Arabia. The events in neigh-
bouring Bahrain were also widely referred to. The 
Saudi Shiites called for the Saudi army to withdraw 
from Bahrain and an end to the repression of the Bah-
raini Shiites. After demands to topple the powerful 
governor of Eastern Province and even the House of 
Saud as a whole, Riyadh cracked down hard.24 
The government accused Iran and the Lebanese 
Hizbullah of being behind the protests and “under-
mining national security and stability”.25 At the same 
time it called on the Shiites to choose between loyalty 
to Saudi Arabia, or to Iran and the leading Shiite 
scholars there. If they chose the latter alternative, the 
ruling family threatened, it would crush the opposi-
tion with an “iron fist”.26 In January 2012 the Interior 
Ministry published a list of twenty-three Shiite ring-
leaders for whom arrest warrants had been issued. 
Some subsequently surrendered to the authorities, 
but others went underground. In the following months 
there were repeated incidents in connection with the 
hunt for the fugitives, sometimes involving the use 
of firearms.27 
Despite these countermeasures another wave of 
demonstrations took place in July 2012. Thousands 
of Shiites protested on the streets of the Shiite strong-
holds of Qatif and Awamiya, chanting anti-monarchy 
slogans like “Down with Al Saud” and “Death to Al 
Saud.” Two demonstrators died and about two dozen 
were injured when the security forces used live am-
munition. The protests were sparked by the detention 
23  Toby Matthiesen, “A ‘Saudi Spring?’: The Shi’a Protest 
Movement in the Eastern Province 2011–2012”, Middle East 
Journal 66, no. 4 (autumn 2012): 628–59 (650). 
24  Ibid. 
25  “Saudi Arabia: Foreign Forces Support Unrest in Qatif, 
Leaders Must Decide Where Their Loyalties Lie” (Arabic), 
al-Hayat, 5 October 2013, 1, 6. 
26  Ibid.; “Beginnings of a Shii Intifada in Saudi Arabia – and 
Worries in the Gulf” (Arabic), al-Quds al-Arabi, 5 October 2011. 
27  In March 2013 the security authorities also announced 
that they had detained eighteen people for spying for Iran. 
Nasir al-Haqbani, “Riyadh Confirms Spy Cell Worked for Ira-
nian Intelligence Services” (Arabic), al-Hayat, 27 March 2013. 
of the religious scholar Nimr Baqir al-Nimr (born 
1960), who had since 2011 become a popular leader 
of the Shiite anti-monarchy opposition. The Saudi 
Interior Ministry claimed that Nimr and his support-
ers had resisted arrest on 8 July and attempted to flee 
by car. During the chase through Awamiya the escape 
car had collided with a police vehicle and Nimr had 
been shot in the leg, it was asserted. According to the 
official accounts, Nimr’s supporters had shot at the 
police, who had only returned fire. Soon after the con-
tested incident an image circulated on the internet 
showing Nimr on the back seat of a car covered by a 
bloodstained blanket. The protests re-erupted soon 
afterwards. 
Nimr had already been detained in 2004 and 2006, 
but quickly released each time. Not until February 
2009 did he become known to a broader public, when 
he responded to the events in Medina by threatening 
to establish a separate Shiite state in eastern Saudi 
Arabia if the government continued discriminating 
against the Shiites.28 The speech spread like wildfire 
on the internet and the security authorities began a 
manhunt. Nimr succeeded in evading arrest during 
the ensuing years and by February 2011 had become 
an important figurehead of the Shiite opposition. 
In his Friday sermons, widely circulated on video, 
he sharply criticised the government and demanded 
political and religious reforms. But in June 2012 he 
overstepped the mark by calling for Shiites to cel-
ebrate the death of Crown Prince (and Interior Minis-
ter) Naif, whom he said bore the greatest blame for 
the repression of the Shiites.29 
This sermon and the subsequent intense manhunt 
were important reasons for his rapidly growing popu-
larity. Nimr was in fact not one of the original leaders 
of the Eastern Province Shiites, but more a marginal 
figure who attracted attention above all for his excep-
tionally radical positions. His influence grew in the 
course of the 2011 and 2012 protests, as he provoked 
the established and moderate leaders of the Shiite 
communities in the Eastern Province with unambigu-
ous demands for an end to the reign of the House of 
Saud. Many militant activists believed, like Nimr, that 
the regime would not voluntarily end anti-Shiite dis-
crimination. From July 2012 young Shiites increasing-
28  Matthiesen “The Shi’a of Saudi Arabia” (see note 21). 
29  Toby Matthiesen, “Neu entfachte Unruhen im Osten 
Saudiarabiens”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 23 July 2012. An abridged 
version of Nimr’s sermon can be found on MEMRI TV, 27 June 
2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RSEG34wxgaY (ac-
cessed 9 July 2012). 
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Protests in Saudi Arabia 
ly emulated their counterparts in Bahrain, attacking 
government buildings and police patrols with petrol 
bombs. At night they frequently set up roadblocks of 
burning car tyres.30 
By 2013 the Eastern Province was deep into a vicious 
circle of repression. Ongoing youth protests amplified 
the government’s fear of broader unrest that could 
threaten the stability of the country. Older, estab-
lished Shiite leaders like the traditional scholars and 
younger Islamists like Hasan al-Saffar repeatedly 
called on the youth to hold back, but their influence 
declined noticeably after 2011.31 The simple fact that 
the protests frequently occurred simultaneously with 
those in Bahrain and the Saudi Shiites plainly felt 
solidarity with their brethren next door gave the issue 
a regional policy edge. But it became especially signifi-
cant because Riyadh suspected Iran of instigating the 
protests, which it claimed represented an Iranian 
attempt to destabilise the Arab Gulf states. This con-
nection of domestic and regional threat perception 
drove Saudi policy during the Arab Spring and has 
had fatal consequences: Domestically it led the govern-
ment to dismiss the Shiite opposition’s demands for 
an end to discrimination, and to respond primarily 
with repression. Its sometimes brutal methods may in 
fact lead young protesters to look around for support 
and find it provided by Iranian entities. At the same 
time, relations with Iran deteriorated. For these reasons 
bilateral tensions have escalated, with the relationship 
looking increasingly like a regional “cold war”. 
 
 
30  Matthiesen, “A ‘Saudi Spring?’” (see note 23), 656. 
31  When Saffar and his group returned from exile in 1993, 
they supplanted older Shiite scholars as discussion partners 
for the government. Today they face a similar fate themselves. 
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Relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran have wors-
ened almost continuously since 2003, accelerating 
since the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011. Saudi 
Arabia and its allies saw the revolutions as dangerous 
precedents and feared their impact on the stability of 
the region’s monarchies. The Saudi government sus-
pected that Iran might exploit instability in the Arab 
states to expand its influence in the region, which 
from Riyadh’s perspective had already increased great-
ly in recent years. The protests of the Shiites in Bah-
rain in particular were interpreted as a threat. Saudi 
Arabia understands events in the region first and fore-
most through the lens of its conflict with Iran and has 
since 2005 been responding more aggressively than 
before to real and perceived Iranian “incursions”. 
When the Arab Spring began, the Saudis felt that an 
anti-Iranian line was even more important than before. 
The trigger for a more active regional policy was 
the accession of a Shiite-dominated, Iran-friendly 
government in Baghdad in spring 2005. To this day 
Riyadh rejects what it regards as an Iran-sponsored 
Iraqi leadership under Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, 
whom it regards as a fanatical sectarian. The second 
main reason for the escalating conflict between Saudi 
Arabia and Iran was the Iranian nuclear programme, 
which Riyadh regards as an exclusively military affair. 
The Saudi leadership finds itself sandwiched between 
fear of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and becoming 
a much greater threat to its neighbours, and worries 
that the United States could be too conciliatory and 
might accept Iranian regional supremacy in return for 
concessions on its nuclear programme. That tough 
dilemma shapes Saudi Arabian policy. 
The Saudi fear of Iran escalated in parallel with the 
revolutions of 2011. One reason for this lay in a covert 
conflict between the United States and Israel on one 
side and Iran on the other that also drew in the Saudis 
and played a decisive role in their subsequently acting 
so decisively in Bahrain, Egypt and Syria. Tehran 
appears to have responded to the assassination of 
Iranian scientists and the infiltration of the Stuxnet 
computer virus by attacking Saudi Arabia, presum-
ably because it lacked the necessary means to hit the 
United States or Israel. Tehran launched its own cyber-
attack, against the Saudi oil company Aramco, while 
terrorist cells controlled by Iran attacked Saudi diplo-
mats. Altogether these incidents led to a further es-
calation and are likely to continue in the absence of a 
resolution of the nuclear dispute acceptable to both 
the Iranians and the Saudis. 
The most serious cyber-attack experienced by the 
Saudis occurred on 15 August 2012, when unidenti-
fied hackers crippled the computers of Saudi Aramco, 
the world’s most influential oil company. This was 
likely the Iranian response to the Stuxnet virus with 
which the United States and Israel attacked Iran. Stux-
net first became known to a broader public in autumn 
2010. It exploited several previously unknown security 
flaws in Windows and other software to modify the 
function of programmable logic controllers used in 
power stations, industrial manufacturing systems 
and heavy industry. The virus was able to take control 
of infected systems without the Iranian operators 
noticing. By this means, the US operators were able to 
cause the centrifuges in the uranium enrichment plant 
at Natanz to run at excessive speeds, causing irrepa-
rable damage and setting the Iranian enrichment 
programme back by one or two years.32 Even after prob-
lems occurred with the centrifuges, the Iranians failed 
to realise that the cause was a cyber-attack. Only when 
the virus appeared on computers outside Iran in spring 
2010 did Western experts conclude that Natanz had 
been its target. In June 2012 it was confirmed that 
NSA and CIA specialists collaborated with Israeli 
agencies to conduct the operation, codenamed “Olym-
pic Games”.33 Apparently lacking the ability to con-
duct a cyber-attack on American or Israeli targets, the 
Iranians chose Aramco as an alternative. 
Saudi Aramco is one of the world’s largest oil com-
panies and the most important for the global oil 
markets.34 In August 2012 a virus, named “Shamoon” 
32  Christopher Bronk and Eneken Tikk-Ringas, “The Cyber 
Attack on Saudi Aramco”, Survival 55, no. 2 (April–May 2013): 
81–96 (82). 
33  The best description is found in David Sanger, Confront and 
Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power 
(New York, 2012), 188–235. 
34  Guido Steinberg, “Saudi-Arabien: Öl für Sicherheit”, in 
Petrostaaten: Außenpolitik im Zeichen von Öl, ed. Enno Harks and 
Friedemann Müller (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007), 54–76. 
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after a word appearing in its source code, disabled 
almost 30,000 of Aramco’s computers and also 
affected the hardware of other energy firms including 
RasGas of Qatar. It deleted most of the data from the 
affected drives and displayed instead the image of a 
burning American flag. Shamoon was significantly 
less sophisticated than Stuxnet, infecting only com-
puters used for internal communication and general 
business, and not those that control production, pipe-
lines and processing. The harm consequently remained 
limited, even if Aramco did need almost two weeks to 
repair all the damage. Although conclusive evidence 
is lacking, the virus probably originated from within 
the Iranian state, as the only entity possessing both a 
strong motive and the considerable resources required 
to pull off such an operation.35 Tehran was primarily 
retaliating for Stuxnet, but Saudi oil policy may also 
have played a significant role. During the course of 
2012, namely, Aramco had stepped up its production 
in order to make up a shortfall caused by Iranian ex-
ports declining after the tightening of sanctions. More-
over, Saudi Arabia had approached important Iranian 
customers in Asia to persuade them to buy their oil 
from Aramco rather than Iran.36 
In its covert conflict with Saudi Arabia, Iran also 
deployed more conventional methods that have been 
part of the repertoire of the Iranian intelligence ser-
vices since the 1980s. In this case, Tehran was respond-
ing to attacks on Iranian nuclear experts that are 
generally attributed to the Israeli Mossad. Between 
January 2007 and January 2012 five Iranian scientists, 
all of whom were working for the Iranian nuclear 
programme, were killed by unknown assailants.37 The 
Iranians struck back in 2011 by attacking Israeli and 
Saudi diplomats. In May a member of the Saudi em-
bassy in Karachi was shot dead in his car. In October 
Saudi media reported that the life of the ambassador 
in Cairo, Ahmad Qattan, had been saved in hospital 
after a poisoning. But the highpoint of the campaign 
was a failed assassination attempt of which Washing-
ton informed the public in October 2011. The target 
was Adel al-Jubeir, the Saudi ambassador in Washing-
ton. 
According to the US Department of Justice, Man-
sour Arbabsiar, an Iranian-born second-hand car 
35  Nicole Perlroth, “In Cyberattack on Saudi Firm, U.S. Sees 
Iran Firing Back”, New York Times, 23 October 2012. 
36  Samuel Ciszuk, “Oil Strike: Saudi Arabia Wields its Energy 
Weapon”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 2013, 56f. 
37  Dieter Bednarz et al., “Die rote Linie”, Spiegel, 2012, no. 10, 
81–90 (87). 
dealer living in Texas, had been asked to carry out 
the plot by two officers from the Quds Brigade of the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard he met during a trip to 
Iran. One of the two, a high-ranking officer not named 
in the indictment, is reported to have been a cousin 
of Arbabsiar’s. The plan was for Arbabsiar to pay mem-
bers of a Mexican drug cartel $1.5 million to murder 
Jubeir by placing a bomb in a restaurant he regularly 
frequented in Washington’s Georgetown district. 
Arbabsiar did indeed travel to Mexico, but the drug 
smuggler he met with was a DEA source and he was 
subsequently arrested in the United States.38 The case 
provoked great astonishment, with many observers 
reluctant to believe that the powerful Quds Brigade 
would rely on the services of a drug cartel and such an 
obviously incompetent figure as Arbabsiar to conduct 
an attack in Washington. The Quds Brigade com-
manded by Qasem Soleimani is, after all, known as a 
particularly important and effective military, intel-
ligence and political instrument of Iranian policy in 
Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and Lebanon. Yet Washington 
appears to have no doubts as to its version of events, 
and Arbabsiar pleaded guilty. All that remains obscure 
is whether the top state leadership was in the know, 
or militant circles within the Revolutionary Guard 
acted on their own initiative. Despite the uncertainty 
of the facts, tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia 
grew after the assassination attempt became known. 
One clear sign of this was that the Saudi leadership, 
in the person of Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, broke 
with custom to explicitly blame Iran.39 
 
 
38  On the sequence of events see Peter Finn, “Iranian Mili-
tant Linked to Murder Plot”, Washington Post, 15 October 2011. 
A detailed description can be found in the Complaint United 
States vs. Manssor Arbabsiar and Gholam Shakuri, Southern 
District of New York, 11 October 2011), http://www.justice. 
gov/opa/documents/us-v-arbabsiar-shakuri-complaint.pdf. 
39  Ahmad Ghallab, “Saud al-Faisal: Iranian Attack on our 
Diplomats Is Nothing New” (Arabic), al-Hayat, 25 November 
2011. 
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 A New Offensive Regional Policy 
 
Still shying away from direct conflict with Iran, the 
Saudi leadership has since 2005 instead moved to 
block real or perceived gains in Iranian influence in 
the region. Since relations deteriorated further after 
2011, the Saudis have been pursuing three fundamen-
tal objectives: Firstly, working to bolster allied mon-
archies in the region and limit the growing influence 
of the Muslim Brotherhood in the transformation 
states. The Saudi leadership has pursued this policy 
increasingly aggressively, openly approving the 
July 2013 military coup against Egyptian President 
Muhammad Mursi and in March 2014 declaring the 
Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organisation. Second-
ly, Riyadh intervened militarily when protests by the 
Shiite majority in neighbouring Bahrain threatened 
the stability of the regime of the House of Khalifa. 
Bahrain’s dependency on Saudi Arabia grew to such 
an extent between 2011 and 2013 that it has become 
unclear whether it is actually still an independent 
state. Thirdly, from 2012 Saudi Arabia supported in-
surgent groups in Syria, so as to contribute to the 
fall of the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Here too, Saudi 
policy appears to have become steadily more aggres-
sive. In all three cases, Tehran sharply criticised the 
Saudi moves. In the case of Syria the risk of escalation 
is especially great because Saudi Arabia is directly con-
fronting an important Iranian ally. 
Solidarity of Monarchs and Autocrats 
The Union of Gulf States 
At the first sign that the protests in North Africa might 
spread to the Gulf states, the Saudi government an-
nounced support for its financially weaker partners in 
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Aid totalling $20 
billion was promised to Bahrain and Oman, prompt-
ing ministers from the GCC states to speak of a “Mar-
shall Plan” for the region.40 In both countries the Saudi 
40  James Gavin, “Taking the GCC Vision Forward”, Middle East 
Economic Digest, supplement GCC Anniversary 2011 (London, 
December 2011), http://www.meed.com/supplements/2011/ 
gcc-anniversary/taking-the-gcc-vision-forward/3098601.article 
(accessed 21 January 2014). 
financial assistance made it easier for the govern-
ments to keep the protests in check. The government 
of Oman was especially successful. Although, as the 
second-largest GCC state, Oman sees itself as a rival of 
Saudi Arabia and therefore probably had reservations 
about accepting the aid, it would have otherwise had 
difficulty conducting such an effective policy of carrot 
and stick from spring 2011. 
In January 2011 there were initially rather small 
demonstrations in the Omani capital of Muscat, large-
ly demanding social and economic improvements 
such as pay increases and action to counteract rising 
living costs and tackle widespread corruption. But in 
February the protests spread to the port city of Sohar, 
the country’s commercial hub. After the security 
forces brutally suppressed them and killed a number 
of demonstrators, the demonstrations expanded to 
other cities. The government now made far-reaching 
concessions, announcing new public-sector jobs and 
increased pay and social benefits. In March it also dis-
missed a number of particularly unpopular ministers 
for corruption and expanded the powers of the elected 
lower chamber.41 At the same time the security forces 
and courts took what was by Omani standards a hard 
line against the protesters.42 In this way the govern-
ment succeeded in restoring its control of the situation. 
Since the 1980s Oman had frequently played an 
obstructive role in the GCC, maintaining much better 
relations with Iran than other members and frequent-
ly also impeding deeper integration among the six 
GCC states. After the events of spring 2011, the Saudi 
King Abdallah appeared to see an opportunity to 
exploit Oman’s dependency on aid from its allies to 
deepen integration. In December 2011 Abdallah pro-
posed that the member-states of the GCC should join 
together more closely in a political and economic 
union. Although the pro-Saudi press celebrated this 
project as a visionary move and an important response 
to Iranian “interference” in the Gulf states, it was 
actually an embarrassing blunder by the king, who 
41  Peter Salisbury, “Mixed Messages on Reform”, Middle East 
Economic Digest, 5–11 October 2012, 34f. (34). 
42  Ibid. 
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A New Offensive Regional Policy 
had probably not even consulted with his ministers.43 
It was clear to any observer that the GCC had previous-
ly failed to cooperate successfully on politically less 
controversial projects such as a common currency.44 
Only the Bahraini leadership responded positively and 
supported the idea of a closer union over the subse-
quent months. The reason for this was that Bahrain, 
like Saudi Arabia, perceived a direct Iranian threat to 
its security and after the Saudi invasion in March 
2011 had become increasingly dependent on its larger 
neighbour. Resistance to a Gulf union was led by Oman, 
which saw it above all as an attempt by the Saudis to 
further entrench their dominance of the Gulf Coopera-
tion Council. Although at least the UAE and Qatar 
probably shared similar reservations, they held back 
with criticism. At the May 2012 GCC heads of state 
summit a partial union of Saudi Arabia and Bahrain 
was still on the table, but shortly thereafter Oman 
abandoned its delaying tactics and in June 2012 For-
eign Minister Yussuf bin Alawi bin Abdallah declared 
without further ado that there would be no political 
union of the Gulf states.45 When Saudi politicians 
again raised the idea in December 2013, Alawi re-
iterated Oman’s rejection, triggering strong words on 
the Saudi side.46 Traditional Omani resistance to Saudi 
dominance in the GCC probably played a role, but 
Muscat could also no longer ignore the Iranian posi-
tion. The official Iranian press opposed plans for a 
union of Gulf states and also railed against the lesser 
variant of closer cooperation between Saudi Arabia 
and Bahrain.47 
43  For an example of such an obsequious piece, see “The 
Federal Gulf Countries?!”, an-Nahar (Beirut), 21 December 
2011. 
44  The failure of the shared currency (originally to have been 
introduced in 2010) stemmed from Kuwaiti and Omani resist-
ance and a conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Emirates 
about the seat of the future central bank. A customs union 
was approved in 2004 but never implemented. Matthew 
Martin, “Plans for GCC Union Flounder”, Middle East Economic 
Digest, 3 July 2012: 32f. (32). 
45  Ibid. 
46  Raghida Dargham, “Cooperation Council Fears Iranian-
Omani Disruption” (Arabic), al-Hayat, 9 December 2014. 
47  See for example “The Deadly Concern of Those Residing 
along the Persian Gulf Coasts of the Arab Spring: Bahrain to 
Be Integrated with Saudi Arabia”, Mardom Salari, 15 May 2012, 
quoted from BBC Monitoring Middle East, Persian Gulf States’ 
Conflicts Can Create “Instability” in the Region – Iran Paper, 17 May 
2012. 
Jordan, Morocco and the GCC 
Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies also worked to support 
the surviving Arab monarchies in Jordan and Morocco, 
which had both experienced only weak protests, and 
to tie both closer to them. They were initially given 
the prospect of joining the GCC, although the offer 
was quickly downgraded to a “strategic partnership”. 
With the original proposal, Saudi Arabia and its part-
ners were probably mainly concerned to reassure both 
monarchies of their solidarity shortly after the start 
of the Arab Spring, but also to send a message to the 
protest movements. 
At the GCC summit in Riyadh in May 2011, Secre-
tary-General Abd al-Latif al-Zayani announced that the 
organisation would make both states an offer of mem-
bership and instructed the foreign ministers to work 
out the details. Representatives of Jordan and Morocco 
did indeed appear at the meeting of foreign ministers 
on 11 September 2011 in Jeddah. In December the GCC 
announced that it would fund development projects 
to the tune of $5 billion in each country, with Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE each contributing 
$1.25 billion in each case.48 
Again, the announcement met with widespread 
scepticism because strong resistance was to be ex-
pected both within the GCC and within the Saudi 
government. This was first of all connected with dif-
ferences in economic structure between the Gulf 
states and both Jordan and Morocco, which are eco-
nomically much weaker than their Gulf partners. Both 
would quickly have become an economic burden on 
the Gulf states. Moreover, Morocco is geographically 
much too far from the Arabian Peninsula to be taken 
seriously as an accession candidate. In the case of 
Jordan, the Gulf states would be accepting a country 
where the Muslim Brotherhood is strongly repre-
sented and Palestinians comprise up to 70 percent 
of the population. Many Gulf politicians regard the 
activities of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Pales-
tinians as a potential danger that they would prefer 
not to see imported into their own countries. 
Accordingly, it became apparent in the course of 
2012 that neither Jordan nor Morocco had any per-
spective of joining the GCC. Instead the December 
2011 promises of $5 billion in aid for each served as 
48  The five billion dollars were to be paid out over the 
course of five years. “KSA to Finance Morocco Projects Worth 
$1.25 bn”, Arab News, 18 October 2012; “Saudi Arabia to Pro-
vide Jordan with $487 mln for Development Projects”, Jordan 
News Agency (Petra), 28 November 2012. 
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compensation for the subsequent failure to pursue 
accession. Instead there was increasing talk of a “stra-
tegic partnership” with the GCC.49 Nonetheless, Jordan, 
which had suffered greatly from the economic reper-
cussions of the Arab Spring, profited from Saudi 
Arabia’s enhanced interest in the stability of its smal-
ler neighbour. Rising energy costs caused by the loss 
of cheap gas imports from Egypt were especially prob-
lematic. Saudi Arabia helped in July 2011 by lifting 
the longstanding closure of its markets to fruit and 
vegetables from Jordan and in October 2011 agreeing 
to intensify cooperation between the two countries’ 
customs authorities to ease cross-border trade and 
travel.50 From 2012 growing assistance was provided 
to care for Syrian refugees in Jordan, financed partly 
by the Saudi government and partly by public dona-
tions.51 Since 2012 both states have also been working 
together to support the Syrian insurgency.52 
With the Egyptian Army against the 
Muslim Brotherhood 
While Saudi Arabia’s support for Bahrain, Oman, 
Jordan and Morocco was about preventing revolution 
spreading to the monarchies, in Egypt it worked to 
restore the army and parts of the old regime to power. 
Regarding the generals as the only possible guarantors 
of stability, the Saudis supported the Egyptian mili-
tary coup in July 2013. But it had taken more than two 
years before Riyadh was able to decide to come down 
so decisively on the side of the counter-revolution. In 
the end, the most important reason was that it saw 
the stability of the state endangered by the policies of 
President Muhammad Mursi and his Muslim Brother-
hood and a growing polarisation of Egyptian society. 
Saudi Arabia also wished to end the reign of the Islam-
ists out of fear of ideological competition. Ultimately, 
Riyadh worried that Tehran could exploit unrest in 
Egypt to expand its influence there. In the preceding 
49  “Asharq Al-Awsat Talks to Moroccan Foreign Minister 
Dr. Saad Eddine El Othmani”, Asharq Al-Awsat (English edi-
tion), 28 February 2012. 
50  Dominic Dudley, “A Watered-down GCC Membership for 
Jordan”, Middle East Economic Digest, 2011, no. 49 (9–15 Decem-
ber), http://www.meed.com/sectors/economy/government/ 
a-watered-down-gcc-membership-for-jordan/3118489.article 
(accessed 21 January 2014). 
51  “Jordanian Ambassador to Riyadh Talks Syrian Refugee 
Crisis”, ash-Sharq al-Awsat (English edition), 1 August 2013. 
52  See “Revolution in Syria” in this study, pp. 21ff. 
years the Saudi leadership had put great effort into 
building a regional alliance of pro-American “moder-
ate” regimes against “extremist” Iran, together with 
Egypt and Jordan. When threatened with the loss of 
Egypt as the most important pillar of that coalition, 
Riyadh believed it had to act. 
As soon as protests broke out in Egypt in January 
2011, the Saudi leadership reassured Egyptian Presi-
dent Husni Mubarak of its support. Riyadh was cor-
respondingly dismayed when he was driven out of 
office on 11 February 2011. All too clear, it appeared 
to the leading princes, were the parallels to the fall 
of the Shah of Iran in 1979. They were particularly 
aggravated by the indifference of the Obama Adminis-
tration, which made no efforts to save its old ally from 
his fate. It was the realisation that the United States 
had little interest in the survival of authoritarian 
regimes in the Arab world that persuaded the Saudi 
Arabian leadership to pursue a more active regional 
policy from 2011, and also a more independent policy 
of its own towards Egypt. At the time there were 
rumours that the Saudis had offered Mubarak refuge, 
but nothing official was said in public. That role was 
taken by the UAE, although the offer was never taken 
up.53 
The Saudi response to Mubarak’s fall was initially 
cautious, but Riyadh approved the provisional take-
over by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF) under Field Marshal Muhammad Husain Tan-
tawi on 11 February. In May 2011 the Saudis agreed 
to support the new Egypt with an initial $4 billion in 
economic aid.54 Behind the scenes the Saudi govern-
ment maintained close contacts with the Egyptian 
military leadership and hoped to prevent the Muslim 
Brotherhood from faring too well in the parliamen-
tary elections, which were held between November 
2011 and January 2012. The Saudi position towards 
Egypt hardened when the Islamists gained about 50 
percent of the vote, all the more so after Muhammad 
Mursi won the June 2012 presidential election as the 
Brotherhood’s candidate. The reason for the Saudi 
rejection of the Muslim Brotherhood lies primarily in 
the fear that it represents a competing – more modern, 
53  “Aufatmen am Golf”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 July 
2013. 
54  Marcel Nasr, “Positive Effects of Unconditional Saudi 
Assistance for Egypt Surpass American Contribution” (Ara-
bic), al-Hayat, 31 May 2011. It was a year before the first of 
the promised four billion dollars was paid out. Kareem Fahim 
and David D. Kirkpatrick, “Saudi Arabia Seeks Union of Mon-
archies in Region”, New York Times, 15 May 2012. 
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republican and frequently also revolutionary – inter-
pretation of political Islam. As soon as the Tunisian 
Nahda Party won the November 2011 elections there, 
implying that the Muslim Brotherhood and ideologi-
cally related groups would play an important role in 
the transformation states, the Saudis started worrying 
that from Egypt the Brotherhood could become as 
great a threat as Gamal Abd al-Nasir had been in the 
1950s and 1960s. Back then, Nasser’s call for pan-Arab 
nationalism, socialism and the fall of the region’s 
monarchies caused great problems for the Saudi 
regime. It ended in a proper “Arab cold war” con-
ducted largely as a proxy conflict in Yemen.55 Because 
Islamists influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood had 
dominated a strong opposition movement in Saudi 
Arabia in the early 1990s too, the House of Saud must 
regard the assumption of power by a transnationally 
organised revolutionary movement in a country as 
important as Egypt as a danger to the internal stability 
of its kingdom.56 As a consequence, after the coup the 
Egyptian military regime first banned the Muslim 
Brotherhood and then in December 2013 declared it 
a terrorist organisation, Saudi Arabia followed suit in 
March 2014. Aside the wish to demonstrate solidarity, 
the ruling family also possessed domestic political 
motives. The fear of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood 
and of Saudi Islamists influenced by them probably 
prompted Riyadh to undertake this very far-reaching 
and factually incorrect categorisation. In reality, the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has not carried out a 
terrorist attack since the 1950s. 
Saudi Arabia’s hostile stance was highly problem-
atic for the Muslim Brotherhood, which was reliant 
on economic aid from the Gulf states and remittances 
from the hundreds of thousands of Egyptian migrant 
labourers there. President Mursi was therefore at pains 
to declare in his inaugural speech that Egypt had no 
intention to “export the revolution”, and visited Riyadh 
shortly after his election in July 2012. In an obvious 
attempt to placate the Saudis, he said that the security 
of the Gulf was a “red line”.57 However, his initiative 
was in vain. This was partly because of his line on Iran, 
55  Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd al-Nasir and 
His Rivals 1958–1970, 3rd edition, (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1971), passim. 
56  On the domestic political dimension see also “Protests in 
Saudi Arabia” in this study, pp. 7ff. 
57  Heba Saleh and Camilla Hall, “Morsi Eager to Ease Saudi 
Fears”, Financial Times, 12 July 2012; “Saudi Pundits Welcome 
Egyptian President’s Visit to Riyadh”, al-Jazeera, 11 July 2012, 
quoted from BBC Monitoring Middle East, 12 July 2012. 
which convinced the Saudis that Egypt under the 
Muslim Brotherhood would abandon Mubarak’s anti-
Iranian policy. In August 2012, shortly after assuming 
office, Mursi visited Tehran; the return trip to Cairo 
by his counterpart Ahmadinejad followed in February 
2013. But particular friction was created by an ulti-
mately fruitless Egyptian initiative in the Syria con-
flict. Mursi used the August 2012 summit of the 
Organisation of the Islamic Conference in Mecca to 
invite the Iranian leadership to join a quartet with 
Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia to search for a diplo-
matic solution to the civil war in Syria. Saudi Foreign 
Minister Saud al-Faisal excused himself from the first 
ministerial meeting in mid-September on reasons of 
health, but no excuse was offered for his absence 
from the second meeting in early October.58 While the 
Saudi leadership appears to have initially hesitated 
somewhat, the view prevailed that neither the Muslim 
Brother Mursi nor the Iranian leadership should be 
granted the prestige associated with the quartet. In 
the following weeks Mursi had to bury the idea of a 
meeting of four. 
The decisive factor for the Saudi decision to sup-
port the coup against President Mursi and the Muslim 
Brotherhood, however, was the domestic political 
escalation in Egypt itself. In the course of the first half 
of 2013 opposition protests against Mursi’s govern-
ment grew while the economic situation deteriorated 
to a point where the country faced bankruptcy. It is 
to this day unclear whether the Egyptian military 
discussed its 3 July coup against President Mursi in 
advance with the Saudi leadership, or sought Saudi 
support. In any case King Abdallah welcomed the coup, 
immediately sending an effusive congratulatory tele-
gram to Egyptian Army Chief Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi.59 
Barely a week later Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait 
announced a total of $12 billion in budgetary aid, cen-
tral bank support and oil products to help Egypt in 
the upcoming months.60 In this way they hoped to 
58  Michael Theodoulou, “Quartet’s Chances for Syria Peace 
May Be Bleak”, The National, 19 September 2012; “Les Saou-
diens absents d’une nouvelle réunion sur la Syrie”, Reuters, 
3 October 2012. 
59  Ellen Knickmeyer, “Saudis Gain amid Islamist Setbacks”, 
Wall Street Journal, 8 July 2013. 
60  Saudi Arabia promised five, the UAE three and Kuwait 
four billion US dollars. Robert F. Worth, “Egypt Is Arena for 
Influence of Arab Rivals”, New York Times, 11 July 2013. Of the 
Saudi five billion dollars, two billion were earmarked as cash 
deposits for the central bank, two billion to be supplied in 
the form of oil products and one billion paid out as direct 
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avoid the new transitional government immediately 
suffering payment difficulties, and replaced Qatar as 
Egypt’s biggest donor. 
The coup in Egypt also had welcome side-effects from 
the Saudi perspective, as it considerably narrowed 
Qatar’s regional influence. Since 2011 Qatar had not 
only stood by the protest movements, but also sup-
plied assistance above all to the Muslim Brotherhood 
and similar Islamist groups. Qatar’s influence had 
grown accordingly after those groups came to power 
in Tunisia and Egypt. Although relations between 
Riyadh and Doha improved tangibly – following long 
years of tension – after 2008 in the face of the Iranian 
threat, they began competing for regional influence 
again in 2011. The coup decided the question in Saudi 
Arabia’s favour, yet Riyadh was not satisfied to leave 
matters there. During the subsequent months the 
Saudi government stepped up its pressure on Doha to 
renounce support for the Muslim Brotherhood. When 
the Qatari leadership refused, Saudi Arabia, the UAE 
and Bahrain recalled their ambassadors from Doha at 
the beginning of March 2014. Rumours flew about 
the imminent possibility of further measures, such as 
blocking Qatar Airways from Saudi airspace or even 
the closure of the border between Saudi Arabia and 
Qatar. The measure plunged the GCC into a dangerous 
new crisis, with Oman and Kuwait declining to recall 
their own ambassadors. If the conflict continues or es-
calates it could threaten the existence of the regional 
organisation. 
Counter-Revolution in Bahrain 
Saudi Arabia acted most decisively in relation to 
neighbouring Bahrain, where it intervened militarily 
after protests threatened to spiral out of control and 
endanger the rule of the House of Khalifa, which is 
closely allied with Saudi Arabia. In Bahrain the Arab 
Spring demonstrations were only one of many waves 
of a protest movement largely rooted in the country’s 
Shiite majority that began long beforehand. Even 
before 2011, Saudi Arabia had been leaning on the 
Bahraini leadership to refrain from taking reforms too 
far, and sought in the first place to hinder the emer-
gence of a constitutional monarchy there. 
The intervention, prompted by a call for help from 
the GCC by the Bahraini government, underlines 
financial aid. Michael Peel, Camilla Hall and Heba Saleh, 
“Saudis and UAE Pledge $8bn”, Financial Times, 10 July 2013. 
Riyadh’s willingness to take great risks in order to pro-
tect the Khalifas and prevent any political emancipa-
tion of the Shiites in Bahrain. The sometimes enraged 
attacks by Iranian politicians and media made it clear 
that Tehran regarded the intervention as a provoca-
tion. This was especially dangerous because the clashes 
in Bahrain did not end with the suppression of the 
demonstrations. Instead, the Shiite youth have suc-
ceeded in maintaining their protests in the face of 
sometimes draconian counter-measures. The outcome 
was festering unrest that could not seriously threaten 
the country’s stability, but threw up the question of 
an alternative solution to the crisis. At the same time, 
financial assistance, military invasion and political 
support made Manama increasingly dependent on 
Riyadh, turning Bahrain into a de facto Saudi Arabian 
protectorate. The Bahraini government therefore 
regarded the union of Gulf states proposed in May 
2011 more as a renewed promise of protection than 
any infringement of its already largely theoretical 
sovereignty. 
The cause of the unrest in Bahrain lies in the politi-
cal and socio-economic disadvantage that the Sunni 
rulers impose on the Shiite majority of 50 to 70 per-
cent of the roughly 550,000 citizens.61 As in Saudi 
Arabia, the conflict sharpened after the 1979 Islamic 
Revolution in Iran, because the Bahraini government 
suddenly saw its domestic Shiites as a potential fifth 
column of the new Islamic Republic of Iran, and 
stepped up its repression. This policy repeatedly led 
to episodes of unrest and a series of protests that ran 
from 1994 to 1998 and became known as the “Bah-
raini Intifada”. The government violently dispersed 
demonstrations, detained thousands and deported the 
leader of the protests. Only after the accession of Emir 
Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa (born 1950) in 1999 did the 
regime make concessions to the opposition, releasing 
political prisoners, permitting exiles to return and 
raising the prospect of democratic reforms. But enthu-
siasm for the announcements, which were codified 
in a “national charter” approved by referendum, was 
already waning by 2002 when it became clear that the 
Khalifas had no intention of sharing power and ending 
the discrimination against the Shiites, as many Bah-
61  The figures are highly contested and government repre-
sentatives often assert that the Sunnis are in the majority. In 
any case the proportion of Sunnis has increased over the past 
three decades. 
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rainis had hoped.62 In the following years unrest 
flared up at intervals and escalated again in August 
and September 2010, when the government detained 
about 160 Shiites in the run-up to parliamentary elec-
tions, including about two dozen opposition leaders.63 
In this atmosphere, the February 2011 protests in 
North Africa, Syria and Yemen also encouraged Bah-
rainis to rise up against the policies of their ruling 
family. The demonstrations began on 14 February and 
within a few days concentrated on the Pearl Round-
about close to central Manama.64 Although many Sun-
nis initially participated, the dominance of the Shiite 
opposition quickly ensured that they drifted away. 
Before dawn on 17 February the government had the 
roundabout cleared by force; four demonstrators died 
and clashes with the security forces ensued during the 
following days.65 Although the ruling family briefly 
changed its tactic and on 13 March offered an open-
ended dialogue, the situation escalated.66 After the 
demonstrators returned to Pearl Roundabout from 20 
February, some raised more far-reaching demands for 
the fall of the ruling family and the end of the mon-
archy. When they also blockaded the nearby financial 
quarter of Manama and threatened to march on the 
royal palace, the ruling family called for assistance 
from Saudi Arabia and the GCC. Saudi and UAE troops 
entered on 14 March, moving into prepared positions 
in the capital Manama and securing key strategic 
points, ministries and other government buildings. 
This freed domestic security forces and squads of 
regime loyalists to break up the protest camp on Pearl 
Roundabout, again killing several demonstrators. At 
62  International Crisis Group (ICG), Popular Protests in North 
Africa and the Middle East (III): The Bahrain Revolt, Middle East/ 
North Africa Report 105 (Brussels, 6 April 2011), 4. 
63  Simeon Kerr, “Bahrain Faces Unrest Ahead of October 
Elections”, Financial Times, 3 September 2010; Thanassis 
Cambanis, “Security Crackdown in Bahrain Hints of End 
to Reforms”, New York Times, 27 August 2010. 
64  In the middle of the roundabout was a large statue com-
prising six upward-pointing stylised dhow sails holding a 
huge pearl. The pearl and the sails symbolised the long his-
tory of pearl-diving and trading in Bahrain, while the number 
six stood for the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Coun-
cil. The monument was erected in 1982 to mark the organisa-
tion’s third summit meeting, and destroyed after the March 
2011 crackdown. 
65  An impressive if one-sided account can be found in the 
documentary “Shouting in the Dark” on aljazeera.net, http:// 
www.aljazeera.com/programmes/2011/08/20118414454779 
8162.html. 
66  Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry, Report 
(Manama, November 2011), 165. 
the same time a wave of arrests began. Seven Shiite 
leaders were later sentenced to long terms of impris-
onment.67 
The Bahraini conflict remains unresolved. One 
reason for this is the radicalisation of the conflicting 
parties. The most important opposition group, 
al-Wifaq, has lost control of the militant Shiite youth. 
Since March 2011 there have been almost nightly 
clashes between demonstrators and security forces 
in the Shiite villages surrounding Manama, during 
which numerous young demonstrators and (much 
more rarely) police have been killed. Increasingly 
frequently demonstrators throw petrol bombs, and 
a number of bombings with improvised explosive 
devices have been carried out.68 The violent protests 
are principally sustained by several thousand young 
militants who have rejected the established political 
organisations, which they regard as too conciliatory. 
They operate under the label “February 14 movement” 
but are only weakly connected to one another through 
social networks such as Twitter. 
In the ruling family and its supporters a shift can 
also be observed towards uncompromising repression 
of the opposition. This current is led by the king’s 
uncle, Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman (born 1935), 
who has led the country’s government since 1971 and 
was already regarded as a proponent of an authori-
tarian security state under the father of the current 
king.69 Other important protagonists are Sheikh Khalid 
bin Ahmad bin Salman Al Khalifa, Minister of the Royal 
Court, and his brother Khalifa bin Ahmad, the com-
mander-in-chief of the armed forces, who are known 
in the country simply as “the Khalids” (al-Khawalid).70 
They are all especially hated by the Shiite opposition, 
and the demand for the prime minister’s resignation 
was one of the top priorities of the demonstrators in 
2011.71 
The present King Hamad Bin Isa Al Khalifa appears 
unable to face down these conservative hardliners. 
Since succeeding to the throne in 1999 as a reformer 
67  Interviews in Manama, 7–11 December 2012. 
68  Inga Rogg, “Eskalation in Bahrain, Polizist durch einen 
Sprengsatz getötet”, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 20 October 2012. 
69  Joseph A. Kéchichian, Power and Succession in Arab Monar-
chies: A Reference Guide (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 
2008), 76f., 91f. 
70  Justin Gengler, “Gulf Apart: Bahrain Faces Political and 
Sectarian Divide”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, (January 2012):  
32–37 (33). 
71  Interview with Shiite opposition figures, Manama, 
10 December 2012. 
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who wished to pursue a less repressive line than his 
father, he has been regarded as more open to dialogue 
and compromise than his relatives. But his reform 
initiatives ended at the latest with the unrest of 2011, 
and he is now either too weak or too indecisive to sup-
port the reformers in the ruling family. Crown Prince 
Salman bin Hamad (born 1969) is regarded as the most 
moderate member of the dynasty, but has lost ground 
to the hardliners. 
Perhaps the most important reason for the strength 
of the hardliners is their closeness to the Saudi govern-
ment. The prime minister maintained a close personal 
friendship with the Saudi Interior Minister (1977–2012) 
and crown prince (2011–2012) Naif bin Abd al-Aziz, 
until his death in 2012. The Saudi leadership and the 
Bahraini hardliners both see the protests as an Iranian 
plot to topple a legitimate government with the aid 
of the Bahraini Shiites, and interpret any attempt to 
come to an understanding with the Shiite opposition 
as a dangerous sign of weakness.72 The Saudi leader-
ship is said to have been insisting for years that it 
would not accept a constitutional monarchy in Bah-
rain, as demanded by al-Wifaq and also desired by 
some of the reformers. But there is no convincing 
evidence of any Iranian role in the protests. In the 
absence of local allies, Tehran instead appears to 
restrict itself to sharply criticising the Bahraini and 
Saudi leaderships for their policies towards the Shiites 
and the intervention in Bahrain. But the accusations 
by the Bahraini and Saudi governments and the verbal 
attacks from Tehran have made many regime-loyal 
Sunnis today much more strongly anti-Iranian and 
anti-Shiite than was the case before 2011.73 For this 
reason the conflict in Bahrain is increasingly assum-
ing a confessional dimension. 
At the same time Bahrain has become so thorough-
ly dependent on Saudi Arabia that it is questionable 
whether it can still be regarded as a sovereign state at 
72  The chair of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Defence 
and National Security in the Bahraini Consultative Council 
(Majlis ash-Shura), Khalid bin Khalifa Al Khalifa, said some-
thing similar on 1 April 2013 in a speech at the Bahrain Inter-
national Symposium of Bahrain University attended by the 
author. The events in Bahrain in 2011 had nothing to do with 
the Arab Spring, he said, and were instead a coup attempt 
supported by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the Leba-
nese Hizbullah with the objective of establishing an Iranian-
style Islamic Republic. 
73  Justin Gengler, “Bahrain’s Sunni Awakening”, Middle East 
Research and Information Project (MERIP), (Washington, D.C., 
17 January 2012), http://www.merip.org/mero/mero011712 
(accessed 5 November 2012). 
all. No longer possessing meaningful oil reserves of its 
own, Bahrain is highly dependent on Saudi Arabia, 
which funds about half of its budget through direct 
and indirect support.74 That dependency has been 
increased since 2011 by the economic repercussions 
of the unrest, as tourists stayed away and the financial 
centre of Manama, which was long one of the most 
important in the Gulf region, suffered. The Shiite youth 
have responded in their own way to the close ties 
between the two countries. It is conspicuous that un-
rest and protests often occur in parallel in Bahrain 
and the Saudi Eastern Province. These are often dem-
onstrations of solidarity, for example by the Saudi 
Shiites shortly after the intervention in Bahrain. But 
religious, cultural and kinship contacts between the 
Shiite communities have always been close, and might 
suggest a certain degree of coordination of activities. 
In any case there is great concern in Riyadh about 
intensified cooperation between the Bahraini and 
Saudi Shiites. 
Growing Saudi influence also impacts on domestic 
political debates in Bahrain. After the death of Saudi 
Interior Minister Naif bin Abd al-Aziz, who had long 
been the Saudi leader responsible for Bahrain, many 
oppositionists hoped that his successor, his son Mu-
hammad bin Naif, would be a moderating influence 
on the Bahraini leadership. Their expectations were 
raised in late 2012 and early 2013 when a Saudi del-
egation did actually seek discussions with al-Wifaq, 
and the Bahraini government made a new offer of 
dialogue in January.75 But as the subsequent months 
were to show, however, the Bahraini and Saudi gov-
ernments were in fact sticking to their guns. 
Revolution in Syria 
Since 2012 Saudi Arabia has also become the most 
important supporter of the Syrian insurgents after 
Turkey and Qatar. However, Riyadh long held back in 
the hope of establishing cooperation with the United 
States. But Washington was unable to decide to sup-
port the rebel groups in any meaningful way, espe-
cially as they became increasingly Islamist. The Saudi 
74  Saudi Arabia shares the 300,000 barrels per day produced 
by the Abu Safa offshore field equally with Bahrain and sup-
plies the Bahraini refinery at Sitra at heavily subsidised prices. 
Kenneth Katzman, Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy, CRS 
Report for Congress (Washington, D.C., 6 January 2014), 34. 
75  Interview with Bahraini intellectual, Manama, 31 March 
2013. 
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hesitancy may also stem from fears concerning the Ira-
nian reaction to their funding and arming the rebels. 
Not until November 2012 were there significant 
indications that Saudi Arabia was working with the 
United States to gradually expand their support for 
insurgents in southern Syria, via Jordan. The United 
States appears to have repeatedly prevaricated and 
obstructed, leaving the Saudis increasingly dissatisfied 
and impatient. The turning point was the Syrian army’s 
chemical attack on the eastern outskirts of Damascus 
on 21 August 2013, in which about 1,400 civilians 
died. When Washington first announced a military 
strike but then changed its mind, Riyadh apparently 
began increasing its support to selected rebel groups 
even without US participation. 
The Saudi government was initially rather uncer-
tain in its stance towards the peaceful protests that 
began in Syria in February 2011. Relations with 
Damascus had been miserable since the assassination 
of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005, a 
close ally of the Saudis. Although they blame Syria for 
the attack, that did not prevent the Saudis from co-
operating with the Syrians after 2008 to prevent an 
escalation of the situation in Lebanon.76 Until spring 
2011 King Abdallah and some of the leading princes 
maintained hopes of one day separating Syria from 
its alliance with Tehran and thus reducing Iranian 
influence in the Middle East. In general terms, too, the 
ruling family tended towards preserving the authori-
tarian status quo and was altogether suspicious of 
the protest movements. Only when Bashar al-Assad 
ignored King Abdallah’s warnings to act less brutally 
towards the demonstrations and the violence spiralled 
in summer 2011, did the Saudi leadership position 
itself against Assad. In a widely noted speech in early 
August King Abdallah criticised the violence of the 
Syrian regime, demanded Assad “stop the killing 
machine” (iqaf alat al-qatl) and called for reforms.77 In 
the same month Riyadh recalled its ambassador from 
Damascus. Under pressure from the Saudis, the Arab 
League also suspended Syria’s membership in Novem-
ber 2011 and imposed additional sanctions.78 
76  Guido Steinberg, Saudi-Arabien als Partner deutscher Nahost-
politik, SWP-Studie 35/2008 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, December 2008), 26, 28. 
77  For extensive excerpts from the speech see “Guardian 
of Holy Sites in ‘Historic’ Speech: Kingdom Rejects Develop-
ments in Syria” (Arabic), al-Hayat, 8 August 2011. 
78  David Ignatius, “Saudi Arabia’s Burst of Confidence”, 
Washington Post, 20 November 2011. 
Although important behind the scenes, in public 
Saudi Arabia was overshadowed by Qatar, which held 
the rotating presidency of the Arab League in 2011 
and chose to back the Syrian opposition. The rivalry 
between the two Gulf states shaped the development 
of the Syrian exile opposition in the subsequent period, 
where its frequent power struggles also reflected 
Saudi-Qatari competition. Initially the Qataris gained 
the upper hand and installed many of their allies in 
the leadership of the Syrian National Council estab-
lished in August 2011 and the National Coalition 
(al-I’tilaf al-Watani) founded in November 2012.79 Qatar 
cultivated representatives of the Syrian Muslim Broth-
erhood, whereas the Saudis backed its secularist rivals. 
After months of bickering the National Coalition chose 
Saudi ally Ahmad Jarba (born 1969) as its leader.80 
Despite the infighting, Saudi Arabia provided diplo-
matic support to the National Coalition jointly with 
Qatar and appears to have somewhat expanded its 
assistance after Jarba’s election. In March 2013 the 
alliance consequently took Syria’s place at the Arab 
League summit in Doha. 
Saudi and Qatari support for the insurgents inside 
Syria followed a similar trajectory. By early 2012 at the 
latest, Qatar and Turkey were funding and arming 
the rebels. Ankara and Doha agreed that their support 
should prioritise groups associated with the Muslim 
Brotherhood, but also supported Salafists and jihad-
ists. In the meantime Riyadh was waiting for Wash-
ington to decide to support the insurgents meaning-
fully.81 Through 2012 there were only isolated reports 
of Saudi Arabia providing Syrian deserters with money 
to purchase small arms and ammunition. 
One particular appointment demonstrated that 
Riyadh was itching to pursue a more resolute line. 
In July 2012 King Abdallah chose Prince Bandar bin 
Sultan Al Saud (born 1949) as the new head of the 
General Intelligence Directorate (Ri’asat al-Istikhbarat 
al-‘Amma, GID). Many observers were astonished 
because Prince Bandar had long ceased to play a sig-
nificant role in Riyadh politics. He had been secretary-
79  Its full name is the “National Coalition for Syrian Revolu-
tionary and Opposition Forces” (al-I’tilaf al-Watani li-Quwa 
al-Thaura wa-l-Muʽarada al-Suriya). 
80  With Muhammad Tayfur, the Muslim Brotherhood also 
supplied one of the two deputies. “Syrische Nationale Koalition 
hat neuen Präsidenten”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 8 July 
2013. 
81  Adam Entous, Nour Malas and Margaret Coker, “Bandar 
the Deal Maker: A Veteran Saudi Power Player Works to Build 
Support to Topple Assad”, Wall Street Journal, 26 August 2013. 
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general of the new National Security Council since 
its institution in October 2005, but appeared unable 
to make political headway against the interior and 
defence ministries.82 Bandar’s appointment repre-
sented a statement in two respects, because he is 
regarded as equally pro-American and anti-Iranian. 
As Saudi ambassador to Washington from 1983 to 
2005 he became a close confidant of the pro-American 
King Fahd, for whom he managed the crucial relation-
ship with the US Administration. During his long ten-
ure as ambassador he became well-liked in Washing-
ton, well-connected in the US political scene and close 
to individual (Republican) politicians. He had also 
always argued for a hard line against Iran. With his 
appointment (in addition to his role in the National 
Security Council) as head of the GID, which was 
responsible for supporting the insurgents in Syria, 
Riyadh appeared to have decided to launch a proxy 
war against Iran.83 In the work of supporting the 
Syrian rebels, Bandar was assisted by his younger 
brother Salman bin Sultan (born 1976), who took 
charge of relations with the Syrian opposition. Despite 
being very young for the post in Saudi terms, Salman 
was unexpectedly promoted to deputy defence minis-
ter in August 2013.84 This was an important indication 
of the growing importance of Bandar and his circle in 
Riyadh politics. 
After Bandar took charge at the GID, Riyadh 
stepped up its pressure on Jordan, whose government 
publicly called for a peaceful resolution but was work-
ing behind the scenes with the United States and 
Saudi Arabia. The Saudi foreign minister is reported 
to have leaned on the Jordanian leadership, which 
initially refused to take an open stance against the 
Assad regime.85 From summer 2012 onwards there 
were sporadic reports in the US press that Washington 
had decided to train and arm insurgents.86 In fact the 
United States had already been training fighters at a 
base in Jordan since 2012. But there appear to have 
been frequent disagreements between the Americans 
and Saudis, because Prince Bandar pressed for more 
decisive action. He also proposed an approach known 
as the “southern strategy” aiming to assist insurgents 
82  For details on Bandar and the National Security Council 
see Steinberg, Saudi-Arabien (see note 76), 8f. 
83  Entous, Malas and Coker, “Bandar” (see note 81). 
84  Ibid. 
85  Interview with GCC diplomat, Manama, 7 December 2013. 
86  See, for example, Karen DeYoung and Anne Gearan, “U.S. 
Closer to Widening Nonlethal Assistance to Syrian Rebels”, 
Washington Post, 11 April 2013. 
independent of the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
jihadists from bases in Jordan to counterbalance the 
groups in northern Syria supported by Qatar and 
Turkey.87 Washington in particular refused repeated 
Saudi demands to supply shoulder-launched anti-air-
craft missiles.88 In the course of 2013 the Americans 
are reported to have repeatedly suspended “southern 
strategy” measures.89 In the face of US resistance, 
Saudi efforts remained largely ineffective. 
From spring 2013 the Saudi leadership became 
increasingly impatient and now publicly demanded 
more determined support for the insurgents. Their 
dissatisfaction spiked in September 2013, after the 
regime’s 21 August chemical attack on the eastern 
outskirts of Damascus in which 1,400 civilians died. 
Washington announced military retaliation, but 
backed down after agreeing with Russia and Syria 
that all Syrian chemical weapons would be destroyed. 
The Saudis viewed the cancellation of the US strike 
as a grave error that the Syrians and Iranians would 
interpret as a sign of weakness.90 Riyadh had not only 
been quick to welcome the controversial decision to 
launch attacks, but had also tried – unsuccessfully – to 
have a resolution backing military action adopted by 
the Arab League.91 
The Saudis seem to have made their decision to 
start assisting selected rebel groups in September 2013, 
initially without the support or assistance of the United 
States. Reports soon began appearing about deliveries 
of light arms and even anti-tank weapons, although 
the Saudis continued to heed the American request 
to deny persistent rebel requests for anti-aircraft 
missiles.92 There was also talk of Saudi Arabia plan-
ning to train up to 50,000 Syrian fighters and infil-
trate them into the country via Jordan to fight the 
Assad regime (and the jihadist groups Jabhat al-Nusra 
and Islamic State in Iraq and Syria). While Saudi poli-
ticians repeatedly insisted that they were supporting 
only the Free Syrian Army, there were persistent reports 
87  Entous, Malas and Coker, “Bandar” (see note 81) 
88  Kevin Sullivan, “Saudis Line Up against Syrian Regime”, 
Washington Post, 8 October 2012. 
89  Interview with GCC diplomat, Doha, 29 October 2013. 
90  Loveday Morris, “Persian Gulf Ties at Risk as Russia Plan 
Is Mulled”, Washington Post, 12 September 2013. 
91  Karen DeYoung, “Kerry: Saudis Support the Strike”, 
Washington Post, 9 September 2013; Mayy el Sheikh, “Arab 
League Endorses International Action”, New York Times, 2 
September 2013. 
92  Anne Barnard and Hwaida Saad, “Syrian Rebels Say Saudi 
Arabia Is Stepping Up Weapons Deliveries”, New York Times, 
13 September 2013. 
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that the Army of Islam (Jaish al-Islam), founded in Sep-
tember 2013 by the Salafist activist Zahran Alloush, 
was to be a second pillar of this strategy.93 In Novem-
ber 2013 the Army of Islam, operating above all in the 
Damascus area, joined forces with other Islamist and 
Salafist (but not jihadist) groups to form the Islamic 
Front (al-Jabha al-Islamiya).94 The Saudis were sus-
pected of being behind this alliance, too. In early 2014, 
however, it still remained unclear whether the Army 
of Islam could really become a militant force to be 
reckoned with, nor to what extent this organisation 
and the Islamic Front would in fact become an instru-
ment of Saudi policy.95 Units of the Islamic Front did 
participate in operations in January 2014 aiming to 
drive out the former al-Qaeda affiliate Islamic State 
in Iraq and Syria. Although the strongest group within 
the Islamic Front, the Free Men of Syria (Ahrar ash-
Sham), are regarded as a Qatari and Turkish client, 
Saudi politicians assert that this occurred at their 
bidding. The Saudis are still seeking to integrate their 
allies into the Free Syrian Army Supreme Military 
Council and chain of command, and to gain them 
political representation through the National Coali-
tion. These moves are, however, unlikely to succeed, 
and a military alternative to the jihadists that is 
strong enough to lead a successful fight against the 
Assad regime is unlikely to emerge. 
 
 
93  For detail on these plans see Yezid Sayigh, Unifying Syria’s 
Rebels: Saudi Arabia Joins the Fray (Carnegie Middle East Center, 
28 October 2013), http://carnegie-mec.org/2013/10/28/unifying-
syria-s-rebels-saudi-arabia-joins-fray/greh (accessed 22 January 
2013). 
94  On their structure see Aaron Y. Zelin, Rebels Consolidating 
Strength in Syria: The Islamic Front, Policy Watch 2177 (Washing-
ton, D.C.: The Washington Institute, 3 December 2013), http:// 
www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/rebels-
consolidating-strength-in-syria-the-islamic-front (accessed 
22 January 2013). 
95  In their first major confrontation with regime forces in 
the Qalamun mountains north of Damascus in early Decem-
ber 2013, the Army of Islam forces appear to have retreated 
very quickly. Yamin Husain, “The Defeat of Nabak: Army of 
Islam under Suspicion” (Arabic), al-Hayat, 10 December 2013. 
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The Syrian example illustrates best how aggressive 
Saudi regional policy has become since the advent of 
the Arab Spring. Riyadh’s plan to support non-jihadist 
Syrian insurgents to counterbalance the rise of the 
jihadists in 2012 and 2013 is still in its infancy, but 
merely proposing to topple an authoritarian Arab 
regime in itself represents a revolution for what was 
just a few years ago still a very cautious Saudi regional 
policy. 
In fact it is far from certain that Saudi Arabia will 
be able to continue its new Syria policy. Firstly, Riyadh 
can only support Syrian rebel forces if one of Syria’s 
immediate neighbours is prepared to cooperate. In 
summer 2012 Saudi Arabia consciously decided to 
work with Jordan, but King Abdallah of Jordan fears 
the vengeance of the Assad regime. It is therefore pos-
sible that the Jordanian government could force Saudi 
Arabia to suspend its aid at any moment. Secondly, 
Saudi Arabia would no longer support the rebels if a 
diplomatic solution were achieved. As unlikely at that 
might appear in the coming years, the situation on 
the ground changes so rapidly and frequently that 
longer-term predictions would be futile. But the longer 
the conflict continues, the more likely it is that the 
Saudis will expand their support and turn the conflict 
into a proxy war with Iran. In that context the strategy 
reportedly pursued since September 2013 of support-
ing non-jihadist Salafist groups alongside the Free 
Syrian Army is extremely dangerous. For it will be 
hard for the Saudis to retain effective control over the 
strengthened groups and prevent them from commit-
ting acts of violence against religious and ethnic mi-
norities. Such atrocities would in turn exacerbate the 
conflict. Additionally, some of the groups thought to 
be supported by the Saudis are cooperating tactically 
with the jihadists of the Nusra Front and thousands of 
Saudi volunteers have joined jihadist organisations 
in Syria. There is some evidence that the Saudi leader-
ship has been taking this problem more seriously 
since winter 2013/14. The most important hint came 
in early 2014, when Prince Bandar lost responsibility 
for the Syria file to his cousin, Interior Minister 
Muhammad bin Naif.96 The latter made a name for 
himself as an energetic fighter against al-Qaeda in 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen and is not expected to sup-
port jihadist groups. 
But in relations with the United States the Syria 
question is only one of several issues that have height-
ened tensions since 2001. The starting point was the 
widespread view in Saudi Arabia that the United States 
is not only inactive in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
but also one-sidedly pro-Israeli. Ill-feeling grew when 
the Bush Administration toppled Saddam Hussein in 
Iraq against the explicit advice of the Saudi leadership. 
But the most important aspect is US policy towards 
the Iranian nuclear programme and Iran’s advances in 
the Arab world. Following the interim agreement on 
the Iranian nuclear programme in November 2013 
Saudi criticism of the Obama Administration assumed 
a sometimes shrill tone. Prince Bandar for example 
threatened that Saudi Arabia would turn away from 
the United States.97 But such threats appear increas-
ingly impotent given that Riyadh has been attempting 
for more than a decade to assert its own interests vis-à-
vis Washington – mostly in vain. The Saudis lack any 
convincing alternative to the United States, because 
no other state is willing and able to guarantee their 
security. Cutting ties with the United States would 
leave the Kingdom vulnerable and unprotected. 
The Saudi leadership’s stormy reaction to American 
willingness to seek a solution with Iran confirms that 
this is where it sees the biggest problem for its regional 
policies. Riyadh fears the Iranian nuclear programme 
not primarily because Tehran might one day order the 
use of nuclear weapon, but more out of concern that 
Iran could exploit an atomic shield to support militant 
groups in neighbouring countries with impunity and 
thus destabilise the Gulf region. That is why stopping 
the Iranian nuclear programme, which Riyadh rightly 
regards as primarily military in motivation, is an im-
portant concern. Behind the scenes, representatives of 
the ruling family have also repeatedly underlined that 
96  Rudolph Chimelli, “Still abserviert: Riads legendärer 
Geheimdienstchef Prinz Bandar entmachtet”, Süddeutsche 
Zeitung, 21 February 2014. 
97  Sayigh, Unifying Syria’s Rebels (see note 93). 
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they are in favour of a military strike against the Ira-
nian nuclear programme and would lend support. 
Because they view Iran’s striving for predominance in 
the Gulf region and the Middle East as a whole with 
great wariness, quite independently of its efforts to 
build nuclear bombs, they cannot welcome any pos-
sible agreement between the United States and Iran 
over the nuclear programme. Instead, a US-Iranian 
rapprochement threatens to erode Saudi Arabia’s role 
as the most important US ally in the Gulf region. In 
Saudi eyes such a reconciliation could quickly lead to 
an agreement permitting Iran to establish regional 
hegemony in exchange for concessions on its nuclear 
programme. So what from the European and German 
perspective would be a complete success – an agree-
ment that made it impossible for Iran to produce 
nuclear bombs with any speed – would from the Saudi 
perspective do nothing to eliminate the underlying 
problem. So if the talks with Iran turn out to be suc-
cessful, a second similarly challenging diplomatic task 
would follow, namely to calm the cold war that has 
already begun between Saudi Arabia and Iran and 
thus reduce its considerable escalation potential. 
That conflict also affects German foreign policy. 
Even if Germany imports only a very small proportion 
of its oil and gas from the Gulf, the region’s signifi-
cance for the global energy markets will tend to in-
crease in the coming years. That applies especially to 
Saudi Arabia, which possesses about one third of the 
world’s known oil reserves. These reserves also give 
the Persian Gulf enormous geopolitical significance in 
the longer run. Since Chancellor Gerhard Schröder’s 
visits in October 2003 and February 2005, all German 
governments have continuously expanded relations 
with the Arab Gulf states. Although the contacts are 
today largely determined by commercial interests, 
Germany has become an increasingly important part-
ner over this period and the security dimension in 
particular is considerably more prominent than just a 
few years ago. The best evidence of this is that Airbus 
Defence is supplying the technology for securing the 
entire length of Saudi Arabia’s external borders. The 
German government has been supporting the project 
since 2009 by sending federal police to train their 
Saudi colleagues to operate the new systems. 
Against this background a debate has emerged in 
Germany about relations with Saudi Arabia, flaring up 
at irregular intervals over news about arms sales. Each 
time, it becomes obvious that the Kingdom is an ex-
ceptionally tricky partner for Germany and that there 
are convincing arguments both for a deepening of 
relations and for a distancing. The fundamental 
insight that Germany, as one of the world’s strongest 
economies, has a deep interest in constructive co-
operation with the world’s largest oil supplier speaks 
for close relations. Since the 1970s Saudi Arabia has 
shown itself to be a dependable energy partner for the 
West, supplying the global economy with oil at accept-
able prices. In recent decades Riyadh has pursued a 
moderate price policy and often utilised its spare pro-
duction capacity to make up for shortfalls arising 
through production and export problems in other oil-
producing states. In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict too, 
Riyadh has promoted solutions that come very close to 
the European proposals, while its regional policy has 
long given preference to diplomatic solutions. 
It is their authoritarian domestic policy, character-
ised by countless human rights violations, that speaks 
against the Saudis, and the political system that grants 
Wahhabi religious scholars enormous influence over 
society, justice and education. The consequence is 
restrictions not only on the religious rights of Chris-
tians and Jews, but in the first place on those of non-
Wahhabi Muslims. In practice this affects principally 
the up to 15 percent Shiites in the Kingdom, who are 
not recognised as Muslims but treated as heretics. The 
Wahhabi slant of Saudi politics also affects Germany 
directly, because Riyadh promotes the export of Wah-
habi teachings by supporting religious NGOs like the 
Muslim World League and its affiliated charities. This 
policy contributes decisively to the global dissemina-
tion of Salafism, which is a domestic as well as foreign 
policy problem for Germany and Europe.98 
Since 2005 Saudi Arabia has been showing an aggres-
sive face in regional politics. Its sometimes justified 
but often paranoid fear of the Muslim Brotherhood, 
Iran and the Shiites in the Arab world, and the coun-
termeasures it adopts, have the effect of worsening 
confessional tensions. In particular its support for the 
Egyptian military coup and the subsequent brutal 
suppression of protests demonstrates that the Saudi 
leadership easily mistakes subjugation for stability. Its 
policy on Bahrain also encourages the regime there to 
reject urgently needed political reforms and keeps the 
unrest alive. Although Saudi Arabia can claim to be 
pursuing a clear line in Syria and focuses its support 
on the Free Syrian army, reports about help for Sala-
98  Guido Steinberg, Wer sind die Salafisten? Zum Umgang mit 
einer schnell wachsenden und sich politisierenden Bewegung, SWP-
Aktuell 28/2012 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 
May 2012). 
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fist groups like the Army of Islam are worrisome. The 
ideological boundaries between them and the jihad-
ists are fluid and – if the reports are accurate – the 
Saudi policy threatens to deliver multi-confessional 
and multi-ethnic Syria to Sunni fanatics. Worse still, 
this policy is likely to exacerbate the future terrorist 
threat to the Arab world and Europe emanating from 
Syrian groups. 
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